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Abstract—ZigBee and other wireless technologies operating in
the (2.4GHz) ISM band are being applied in Wireless Body Area
Networks (WBAN) for many medical applications. However, these
low duty cycle, low power, and low data rate medical WBANs
suffer from WiFi co-channel interferences. WiFi interference
can lead to longer latency and higher packet losses in WBANs,
which can be particularly harmful to safety-critical applications
with stringent temporal requirements. Existing solutions to WiFi-
WBAN coexistence either require modifications to WiFi or
WBAN devices, or have limited applicability. In this paper, by
exploiting the Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) mechanisms in
WiFi devices, we propose a novel policing framework, WiCop,
that can effectively control the temporal white-spaces between
WiFi transmissions. Specifically, the WiCop Fake-PHY-Header
policing strategy uses a fake WiFi PHY preamble-header broad-
cast to mute other WiFi interferers for the duration of WBAN
active interval; while the WiCop DSSS-Nulling policing strategy
uses repeated WiFi PHY preamble (with its spectrum side lobe
nulled by a band-pass filter) to mute other WiFi interferers
throughout the duration of WBAN active interval. The resulted
WiFi temporal white-spaces can be utilized for delivering low
duty cycle WBAN traffic. We have implemented and validated
WiCop on SORA, a software defined radio platform. Experiments
show that with the assistance of the proposed WiCop policing
schemes, the packet reception rate of a ZigBee-based WBAN can
increase by up to 43.8% in presence of a busy WiFi interferer.
Keywords-WBAN, WiFi, reliability, coexistence, safety
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN) plays a key role
in future e-health [1]. For example, one important WBAN
application is multi-parameter monitoring, where multiple vital
signs of a patient are monitored continuously. These vital
signs are sampled by the sensors mounted on the patient,
and displayed on a central monitor. Traditionally, sensors are
wirely connected to the central monitor. Wire connections limit
the mobility of patients, and if sensors fall off due to patients’
movements, or if people trip over wires, accidents may happen.
To mitigate these problems, WBANs are proposed to connect
the many sensors, monitors, and other medical devices wire-
lessly. There are many possible WBAN medical applications.
One typical example is the multi-parameter monitoring. In
multi-parameter monitoring, the sensors and the monitor form
a single-hop wireless network with the monitor acting as a
base-station and sensors as clients.
WBANs can be built upon various candidate wireless tech-
nologies operating in different Radio Frequency (RF) bands.
For example, the IEEE 802.15.6 WBAN standardization work-
ing group are considering traditional Wireless Medical Teleme-
try Service (WMTS) band, Industrial Scientific and Medical
(ISM) 2.4GHz band, Ultra Wide Bandwidth (UWB) band
etc. in their discussions. Among these RF bands, the ISM
band is the most attractive due to its license-free nature, and
consequently a wide range of available devices and vendors.
Among the technologies in the ISM band, ZigBee, Bluetooth,
and the draft IEEE 802.15.6 2.4GHz standard suit WBANs the
best due to their low power consumption, low radiation, and
low cost [1]. However, all of them may suffer from coexistence
interference from the nowadays pervasive WiFi (aka IEEE
802.11) networks [2][3][4][5][6], which run on the same ISM
2.4GHz band. Though the coexistence interference may not be
a major concern for low duty-cycle non-critical applications
such as body temperature monitoring [7], it is not the case
for WBAN applications with stringent requirements on packet
delivery ratio and/or latency. One example is Electrocardio-
graphy (ECG) monitoring [8]. The IEEE 1073 [9] standard
mandates that each ECG sample be delivered within 500ms
[8]. A sample delivered after its 500ms deadline is considered
lost, which means a fault happens.
To give an idea on the WiFi coexistence challenge, Fig. 1
(quoted from [10]) shows the Packet Reception Rate (PRR) of
a ZigBee link under WiFi interference. The PRR drops below
20% when the ZigBee receiver is 15 feet away from a WiFi
(specifically, IEEE 802.11g) interferer. This shows that WiFi
interference is a significant threat to ZigBee-based WBANs.
To deal with the WBAN-WiFi coexistence challenge, three
categories of solutions have been proposed, each with its own
limitations. The first category of solutions aim to operate
WBAN over RF channels sufficiently away from the active
WiFi RF channels [7]. For instance, in US, a ZigBee-based
WBAN can use ZigBee channel 25 and 26, which do not
overlap with any WiFi RF channels [10]. However, this greatly
This is the Pre-Published Version.
Fig. 1. Packet Reception Rate (PRR) of a ZigBee link under WiFi interference
(quoted from [10]). The X axis indicates the distance from the ZigBee receiver
to the WiFi transmitter; the Y axis is the PRR of the ZigBee link. In the left
sub-graph, the WiFi interferer is an IEEE 802.11b device; while in the right
sub-graph, the interferer is an IEEE 802.11g device. IEEE 802.11b/g are the
two major subtypes of WiFi (IEEE 802.11) devices.
limits the RF spectrum that WBANs can use. The second
category of solutions revise current WBAN or WiFi standards,
adding intelligent coexistence schemes to make WBAN or
WiFi devices more aware of one another [10][11]. However,
the demand to modify existing standards/implementations
makes it hard to use Commercially-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
devices. The third category of solutions try to spatially separate
WBANs from WiFi networks via careful configuration-time
planning. However, this is often difficult as WiFi networks
may not be under the same administration domain as WBANs.
Furthermore, unintended usage of mobile WiFi devices may
still cause spurious outages in WBANs1.
In this paper, we propose WiCop, a novel policing frame-
work different from the aforementioned three categories of
solutions. WiCop addresses the WBAN-WiFi coexistence
problem by effectively controlling the temporal white-spaces
(gaps) between consecutive WiFi transmissions. Though tem-
poral white-spaces are abundant in light to medium loaded
WiFi networks [10], they are scarce in heavy loaded WiFi
networks and tend to be irregular. Our approach “engineers”
the intervals and lengths of WiFi temporal white-spaces, and
utilizes them to deliver low duty cycle WBAN traffic with
minimum impacts on WiFi. WiCop exploits the Clear Channel
Assessment (CCA) mechanisms in the WiFi standard. Two
policing schemes are proposed: 1) Fake-PHY-Header and 2)
DSSS-Nulling. We have implemented and validated WiCop on
SORA [12], a software defined radio platform. Experiments
show that under WiFi interference, WiCop can raise WBAN
packet delivery rates by up to 40%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly introduces WiFi (IEEE 802.11) standard. Section III
presents a case study showing the significance of WiFi co-
channel interference on WBAN, using ECG monitoring as
the medical application background. Section IV proposes the
WiCop policing framework to engineer WiFi interference
traffic’s temporal white-spaces for WBAN communications.
Section V elaborates how the WiCop framework is imple-
1Repeated probe requests have been reported on certain WiFi devices when
they are not associated with particular APs.
mented on Microsoft SORA software defined radio platform.
Section VI evaluates our WiCop framework through exper-
iments. Section VII discusses related work. Section VIII
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Before delving into the details of WiCop, we first give
an overview of the WiFi (aka IEEE 802.11) standard. The
WiFi standard boils down to several subtype standards, of
which, most of nowadays COTS WiFi devices comply with the
subtype standard of IEEE 802.11a, b, g, or n. IEEE 802.11b
is the first to reach mass production, which runs Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) in the 2.4GHz ISM band.
IEEE 802.11a emerges next, and runs Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiplexing (OFDM) in the 5GHz ISM band, a
less frequently used RF band due to more stringent line-of-
sight transmission constraints. IEEE 802.11g supports IEEE
802.11a-like OFDM in the 2.4GHz ISM band, meanwhile is
fully backward compatible with IEEE 802.11b. IEEE 802.11n
mainly enhances the previous three by adding Multiple Input
Multiple Output (MIMO) anntenna support.
In the following, we shall only look at those common
features of IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n that are critical to our WiCop
strategies.
Full Occupation of 2.4GHz ISM Band: Every WiFi subtype
standard predefines a fixed set of RF channels. Though a
single WiFi network can only use one of these predefined
RF channels, when several WiFi networks coexist in an area,
they will try or will be configured to use non-overlapping
RF channels. This can easily exhaust the whole 2.4GHz ISM
band. For example, two coexisting IEEE 802.11n networks are
enough to occupy the whole 2.4GHz ISM band. Such scenario
is not uncommon nowadays given the ubiquitous presence
of WiFi networks. When all such WiFi networks are active,
jamming the whole 2.4GHz ISM band, it is hard to carry out
WBAN communications, no matter the WBAN uses ZigBee,
Bluetooth, or the draft IEEE 802.15.6 2.4GHz standard.
Common Packet Formats: Due to backward compatibility
considerations, all subtypes of WiFi running in 2.4GHz ISM
band recognize the IEEE 802.11b packet format.
Viewing from the Physical Layer (PHY), we can abstract
an IEEE 802.11b packet as three consecutive segments (see
Fig. 2): PHY preamble, PHY header, and DATA2.
The PHY preamble is for receiver carrier acquisition.
The PHY header contains several fields that carry con-
trol/management information. What is important is the
LENGTH field, a 16-bit unsigned integer indicating the num-
ber of microseconds required to transmit the DATA segment.
This implies that a maximum of 65535µs can be reserved for
DATA segment.
2which correspond to Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) pream-
ble + Start Frame Delimiter (SFD), PLCP header, and PLCP Service Data
Unit (PSDU) respectively according to standard jargon [13].
Fig. 2. IEEE 802.11b PHY packet format.
Clear Channel Assessment (CCA): All subtypes of WiFi
carry out Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) MAC pro-
tocol. According to CSMA, an IEEE 802.11 node shall always
listen to the wireless medium before transmission. Only when
the wireless medium is idle will the node start transmitting.
This procedure is called Clear Channel Assessment (CCA).
There are three types of CCA: Energy Detection (ED) only,
Carrier Sense (CS) only, and ED+CS (the combination of ED
and CS). ED-only CCA measures the wireless medium spectral
power level; if it is greater than a threshold, the wireless
medium is considered busy. CS-only CCA tries to capture
WiFi PHY preambles; if a PHY preamble is successfully
captured, the wireless medium is considered busy. Usually,
CS-only CCA also looks into the content of the PHY header
immediately following the captured PHY preamble (if there
is one) to provide more accurate CCA evaluations. ED+CS
CCA does both. In practice, CS-only CCA and ED+CS CCA
are most widely implemented [14][15].
III. A CASE STUDY ON ECG MONITORING
In this section, we study the performance of a ZigBee
WBAN for ECG monitoring under WiFi interference, so as
to empirically show the necessity of addressing the WBAN-
WiFi coexistence problem.
A. Experiment Setup
Fig. 3 shows the layout of the experiment. The ECG
monitoring WBAN consists of one base station and one ECG
sensor, implemented by two TMote Sky nodes (aka motes, a
well-known ZigBee device) [16] respectively. In Fig. 3, the
base station is denoted as Mote-B, and the ECG sensor is
denoted as Mote-C; the distance between Mote-B and Mote-
C is d2. The transmission power of Mote-B and Mote-C is
set to the maximum: 0dBm. Host-Z is a laptop connected
with Mote-B through USB for data collection. Host-I is the
WiFi interferer. It sends packets to WiFi Access Point (AP)
via an IEEE 802.11g wireless connection. The distance from
Host-I to Mote-B and Mote-C are both d1. In addition, Host-
M is connected to the WiFi AP to record WiFi interference
traffic between Host-I and the WiFi AP. An additional WiFi
sniffer is deployed which passively logs WiFi events on the
wireless medium. Host-P runs WiCop and is not used in this
experiment.
Upon reception of ECG samples from the ECG sensor,
the ECG base station reconstructs the ECG traces. A typical
Fig. 3. Experiment Layout
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of normal ECG[17]
ECG trace for one heart beat period is shown in Fig. 4.
An ECG trace normally contains P-wave, QRS complex, and
T-wave[17]. The QRS complex usually has a much bigger
amplitude than the P-wave[17], and contains rich frequency
components. Therefore, good ECG monitoring needs high
sampling rate. In our case study, the ECG sensor samples at
250Hz, a typical value for quality ECG monitoring [18]; and
each sample is 8-bit. The ECG sensor (Mote-C) sends the base
station (Mote-B) one packet every 100ms. Hence each packet
contains 250Hz × 100ms = 25 new ECG samples, which we
call an ECG sample chunk. In addition, to increase reliability,
the ECG sensor (Mote-C) buffers the immediate 2 previous
ECG sample chunks to be sent in the same packet as the
new ECG sample chunk. Hence each packet contains 3 ECG
sample chunks, i.e., 25 × 3 = 75 ECG samples; and every
ECG sample is retransmitted 3 times. At the typical ZigBee
raw bit rate of 250kbps, the transmission time cost of each
packet is less than 4ms.
B. Performance Metric
To evaluate the performance of ECG monitoring under WiFi
interference, we consider two metrics. The first metric is
Packet Reception Rate (PRR), defined as the probability that
a packet is successfully received.
Let Tpolling denote the ECG packet transmission period
(Tpolling = 100ms in our case study). As mentioned before,
Fig. 5. PRR and MTTF of ECG monitoring WBAN under 802.11g
interference
ECG samples are only transmitted in the grouping of ECG
sample chunks; and each ECG sample chunk is retransmitted
Nre = 3 times within Tpolling × Nre = 300ms (which is
within the typical ECG sample delivery deadline [8]). An ECG
sample chunk is lost iff it fails all its Nre retransmissions.
We hence introduce a second metric, Mean Time To Failure
(MTTF), which is the expected duration between two ECG
sample chunk losses. Using Markov chain analysis, we have
MTTF =
Tpolling
PERNre
, (1)
where PER def= 1− PRR.
C. Experiment Results and Observations
With the layout set as Fig. 3, we let Host-I transmit at an
application layer rate of 30Mbps to the WiFi AP to emulate
WiFi interference. The transmission power of Host-I is 30mW,
a typical value adopted in practice [19]. As the distance from
Host-I to Mote-B varies from 12 feet to 4 feet, the PRR
decreases from 98% to 67% (see Fig. 5). At 67% PRR, the
MTTF is 2.8s. In other words, on average every 2.8s, an ECG
sample chunk may be lost. This would be a serious problem,
as shown by Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 illustrates what it means when one ECG sample
chunk is lost. In the figure, the solid line curve is the actual
ECG curve; the dashed line curve is the ECG curve received at
the base station (for ease of illustration, we moved this curve
350mV downward). The ECG sample chunk for 300 ∼ 400ms
is lost. This results in the loss of a whole QRS complex, which
carries critical information on the heart.
IV. WICOP POLICING STRATEGIES
In this section, we present the details of WiCop in regulating
WiFi temporal white-spaces. The basic idea is to exploit the
WiFi CCA mechanisms: sending WiFi compliant signals to
refrain WiFi stations from transmitting.
Fig. 6. Comparison of the raw and the (after-packet-loss) distorted ECG
Fig. 7. Maximum duration a WiFi device mutes upon receiving a WiFi
packet (whose PHY header LENGTH field is set to maximum).
A. Strategy I: Fake-PHY-Header
Policing Signal: As mentioned in Section II, viewing from
PHY layer, a WiFi packet transmission begins with a PHY
preamble, followed by a PHY header, and then the DATA.
The PHY header carries a LENGTH field (see Fig. 2), a 16-
digit unsigned integer specifying the number of microseconds
that WiFi packet lasts.
When a WiFi device detects a PHY preamble and decodes
the following PHY header, it will mute (i.e., refrain from
transmitting) for a number of microseconds depending on the
received LENGTH field and the device’s specific implemen-
tation.
As the LENGTH field is a 16-bit unsigned integer, in
theory, a maximum of 65535µs can be reserved. However,
our calibration measurements show that the actual maximum
duration that can be reserved is vendor dependent, as shown
in Fig. 7. Fortunately, Fig. 7 also show all WiFi devices from
major vendors can mute for at least 24ms. This is enough
for reserving temporal white-spaces for our ECG monitoring
WBAN communications: with each WBAN packet containing
75 8-bit samples, our WBAN only needs no more than 4ms
to send a packet from the ECG sensor to the base station.
MAC Protocol: In this paper, we only focus on the scenario
that WBAN carries out centralized polling, with a WBAN
polling period of Tpolling (e.g., our case study in Section III
Fig. 8. Temporal scheme of Fake-PHY-Header policing
assumes a WBAN polling period of Tpolling = 100ms).
During each WBAN polling period, there is an interval that we
call WBAN active interval. WBAN communications are only
carried out during this WBAN active interval.
To policing means to force WiFi interferers to mute during
the WBAN active interval in each WBAN polling period. To
do this, we add an policing node to the WBAN. The policing
node runs the WiCop framework by properly sending policing
signals and controlling the WBAN operations. Ideally, the
policing node shall reside on the same host as (or directly
wired with) the WBAN base station, for easy control of the
WBAN operations. One specific implementation is described
by Fig. 3, where Host-P functions as the policing node, and is
wired to the WBAN base station (Mote-B) through high-speed
Ethernet.
In the temporal domain, the policing node and the WBAN
base station must carry out a coordinated Multiple Access
Layer (MAC) protocol to achieve the policing effect.
With the above in mind, Fig. 8 explains the Fake-PHY-
Header MAC protocol in the temporal domain.
Each WBAN polling period is started with a policing
node broadcast (the so called Fake-PHY-Header beacon): a
fake WiFi packet with only PHY preamble and PHY header.
Although this fake WiFi packet does not have DATA segment,
its PHY header’s LENGTH field still claims a packet duration
equivalent to the temporal length of the WBAN active inter-
val (hence “faking”). Immediately following this fake WiFi
packet, the WBAN active interval starts (this can be achieved
by application layer communications between the policing
node and the WBAN base station), where the WBAN base
station can poll its client(s).
The intuition of Fake-PHY-Header policing is that on hear-
ing the Fake-PHY-Header beacon, a WiFi interferer will mute
for the following WBAN active interval, creating a temporal
white-space for WBAN to communicate.
B. Strategy II: DSSS-Nulling
Policing Signal: It is well-known that the continuous sending
of repeated WiFi PHY preambles can jam other WiFi de-
vices’ transmissions [14][20]. Since WiFi PHY preamble is
a DSSS modulated signal, we call the continuous sending of
repeated WiFi PHY preamble “DSSS-Jamming”. We intend to
use DSSS-Jamming as another means of policing. However,
DSSS-Jamming not only jams WiFi devices, it also jams
other co-channel wireless devices. To solve this problem, we
reshape the DSSS-Jamming signal with a band-pass filter to
generate the desired policing signal. We call such generated
Fig. 9. PSD of WiFi interferer signal, DSSS-Nulling policing signal, and
ZigBee signal
Fig. 10. Frequency response of the FIR that reshapes DSSS-Jamming signal
into DSSS-Nulling signal (baseband equivalent spectrum)
policing signal “DSSS-Nulling” (i.e., the sides of the DSSS-
Jamming signal spectrum are “nulled” to create spaces for
WBAN signals) signal, and the corresponding policing scheme
the “DSSS-Nulling” policing.
Fig. 9 compares the Power Spectral Density (PSD) of WiFi
interferer signal, DSSS-Nulling policing signal, and ZigBee
signal. When a DSSS-Nulling signal is present, a WiFi device
thinks the carrier is busy and backs off. In contrast, as DSSS-
Nulling signal does not occupy ZigBee channel Z11 and Z14,
ZigBee communications are still possible.
In our prototype implementation, the band-pass filter to re-
shape DSSS-Jamming signal is a raised cosine Finite Impulse
Response (FIR) filter, which results in a DSSS-Nulling signal
bandwidth of 8MHz (in comparison, WiFi signal bandwidth
is 22MHz). MATLAB simulations show that the side lobe of
this filter is −55dB (Fig. 10). In other words, DSSS-Nulling
signal’s interference power on WBAN is 55dB less than that
of DSSS-Jamming signal.
Alternatively, one can use other forms of noise signal
(e.g., simply a sine wave) in the WiFi band to jam/police
WiFi transmission. However, as DSSS-Nulling signal carries
repeated WiFi PHY preamble information (though damaged by
the band-pass filter), it can more effectively jam WiFi devices
that support CS-only or ED+CS CCA. Based on Tanenbaum
and Wetherall [21], we can infer DSSS-Nulling signal can use
20dB less power than other forms of noise to jam a ED+CS
CCA WiFi device.
Fig. 11. Temporal scheme of of DSSS-Nulling policing
MAC Protocol: Same as the Fake-PHY-Header policing
case, DSSS-Nulling policing still assumes the WBAN runs
centralized polling and the policing node resides on the same
host as (or is directly wired to) the WBAN base station.
But instead of preceding a WBAN active interval, the DSSS-
Nulling signal persists throughout the WBAN active interval
as shown by Fig. 11.
C. Comparisons of Policing Strategies
Let us first assume each policing signal broadcast succeeds
in suppressing all WiFi interferers.
In each WBAN polling period, there only needs to be
one Fake-PHY-Header broadcast, which occupies 22MHz of
spectrum (the standard WiFi PHY preamble/header spectrum
bandwidth) and 0.2ms. Such a broadcast allows 4 ZigBee
channels to communicate throughout one WBAN active in-
terval. Therefore, the efficiency of Fake-PHY-Header policing
is
ηfake phy hdr
def
=
Time-Spectrum Reserved for WBAN
Time-Spectrum Overhead
=
4BzigbeeTwban act int
22× 0.2
=
BzigbeeTwban act int
1.1
, (2)
where constant Bzigbee(MHz) is the bandwidth of a ZigBee
channel, Twban act int(ms) is the length of WBAN active
interval.
Through experiments, we find effective DSSS-Nulling
policing signal occupies at least 8MHz of spectrum. Mean-
while, DSSS-Nulling signal must persist throughout the
WBAN active interval. This implies DSSS-Nulling policing
can only help reserve two ZigBee channels throughout the
WBAN active interval. Therefore, the efficiency of DSSS-
Nulling policing is
ηdsss nulling
def
=
Time-Spectrum Reserved for WBAN
Time-Spectrum Overhead
=
2BzigbeeTwban act int
8× Twban act int
=
Bzigbee
4
. (3)
As Twban act int is usually 4ms ∼ 40ms, at the first glance,
Formula (2) and (3) implies Fake-PHY-Header is more effi-
cient than DSSS-Nulling. However, remember this is under
the assumption that each policing signal broadcast succeeds
in suppressing all WiFi interferers. In practice, DSSS-Nulling
is much more reliable than Fake-PHY-Header in suppressing
all WiFi interferers, as the former repeatedly broadcasts WiFi
PHY preamble throughout the WBAN active interval; while
the latter only broadcasts WiFi PHY preamble (and header)
once.
A more comprehensive comparison between Fake-PHY-
Header and DSSS-Nulling policing is summarized by Table I.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF FAKE-PHY-HEADER AND DSSS-NULLING POLICING
Fake-PHY-Header DSSS-Nulling
Time-Spectrum
Efficiency (if policing
broadcast succeeds)
BzigbeeTwban act int
1.1
Bzigbee
4
Success Probability Low High
Affected WiFi Inter-
ferer
CS-only CCA,
CS+ED CCA
CS-only CCA,
CS+ED CCA, ED-
only CCA
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented WiCop upon Microsoft Research Software
Radio (SORA) [12] platform.
A SORA platform consists of the following hardware: a
desktop computer (denoted as Host-P in Fig. 3), a Radio
Control Board (RCB), and a third-party radio daughter board.
The radio daughter board that we use is USRP XCVR2450.
Correspondingly, the SORA platform software mainly con-
sists of the various software defined radio drivers and the
corresponding development tools. For WiCop, we mainly im-
plemented the aforementioned policing strategies upon SORA
Soft WiFi driver v1.0 (simplified as “SORA driver” in the
following). The details are as follows.
As shown by Fig. 12, in order to transmit a policing signal,
WiCop sends a policing packet down through the SORA stack,
which involves five layers (including three layers in the SORA
driver: Link Layer (LL), MAC, and PHY). Each layer carries
out special processing of the policing packet.
At the application layer (denoted as “Police App” in
Fig. 12), WiCop customizes the payload of the policing packet
according to the specific policing strategy used. For Fake-PHY-
Header policing, the policing packet payload is nulled. For
DSSS-Nulling policing, the policing packet payload length is
adjusted according to WBAN active interval length, and the
payload digits are all set to one. At the network layer (denoted
as “UDP socket” in Fig. 12), a special IP/MAC address is used
to flag the policing packet. In the LL layer, upon detecting the
flagged IP/MAC address, we add special tags to the policing
packet’s descriptor (a data structure in SORA to record packet
information). In the MAC layer, policing packets’ backoff is
deliberately shortened (to less than standard IEEE DIFS) to
achieve a higher priority when contending with WiFi interfer-
ers. In the PHY layer, special processing is done according
to the tag in the policing packet’s descriptor. For Fake-PHY-
Header policing packet, we customize the LENGTH field to
cover the whole WBAN active interval. For DSSS-Nulling
Fig. 12. Procedure of sending a policing packet
policing packet, we apply the band-pass filter to null its
spectrum side lobe.
To realize the WiCop policing strategies, the policing node
must work with the WBAN base station simultaneously. In our
experiment set up (see Fig. 3), this is achieved by wiring the
policing node (Host-P) and the WBAN base station (Mote-B)
host (Host-Z) with high speed Ethernet.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluated WiCop through experiments.
A. Effects on WiFi Temporal White-Spaces
We first compare the WiFi temporal white-spaces when
there is and is not WiCop policing. The experiment set up
reuses Fig. 3’s layout. Host-I is the WiFi interferer, which
keeps sending WiFi traffic to WiFi AP. Host-P is the WiCop
policing node, which is wired to the WBAN base station
Mote-B (via Host-Z). The WBAN polling period is 10ms, and
the WBAN active interval is less than 5ms. To protect such
WBAN, the policing node broadcasts policing signal every
10ms, claiming a WBAN active interval of 5ms. This affects
the WiFi interference traffic, which is recorded by Host-M, as
Host-M monitors the WiFi AP (the WiFi interference traffic
destination). Fig. 13 shows two typical excerpts of the WiFi
interference traffic trace, one from when there is no WiCop
policing, and the other from when there is WiCop policing
(without loss of generality, the specific policing strategy used
in this example is Fake-PHY-Header).
It is easy to see that when there is no policing, there is few
WiFi temporal white-spaces wide enough to allow the 5ms
WBAN active intervals (see Fig. 13(a)). In contrast, when
there is policing, WiFi temporal white-spaces of more than
5ms wide emerge every 10ms, enough to allow the periodical
WBAN communication: with period of 10ms and WBAN
active interval length of 5ms.
We then compare the effectiveness between Fake-PHY-
Header policing and DSSS-Nulling policing. Fig. 14 compares
the statistics of WiFi temporal white-space lengths under these
two policing strategies. For each policing strategy, we rerun
the aforementioned experiment for 25s, with a WBAN polling
period of 25ms and WBAN active interval of 5ms. Therefore,
25s/25ms = 1000 WiFi temporal white-spaces of length
≥ 5ms should be created, if the policing is successful. This
(a)
(b)
Fig. 14. (a) Histogram showing WiFi temporal white-space distribution under
Fake-PHY-Header policing (b) Histogram showing WiFi temporal white-space
distribution under DSSS-Nulling policing. The X axis is the range of the
lengths of WiFi temporal white-spaces (granularity: 1ms); the Y axis is the
the number of such WiFi temporal white-spaces encountered throughout the
25s experiment trial. Y axis is truncated at 1050 to save page space: temporal
white-spaces in the 0 ∼ 1ms range are mostly those between consecutively
transmitted WiFi packets. WiCop sends a policing packet every 25ms to claim
5ms of WBAN active interval.
matches the results of Fig. 14, i.e., both Fake-PHY-Header
and DSSS-Nulling achieve the goal of creating wanted WiFi
temporal white-spaces. Note Fig. 14 also shows there are a
large number of WiFi temporal white-spaces of length less
than 1ms. This is because when WiFi is allowed to transmit
continuously, there are short temporal white-spaces (each less
than 1ms) between consecutive WiFi packets.
It is also of interest to see how WiFi transmissions are
negatively affected by WiCop. Fig. 15 shows the throughput of
TCP and UDP connections over WiFi when there is policing.
The WBAN polling period is still 25ms. As the claimed
length of WBAN active interval increases, the WiFi throughout
decreases. However, when the claimed WBAN active interval
is 5ms, the decreases of TCP/UDP throughput are both mild.
This shows that our policing strategies enable the coexistence
of WiFi and WBAN.
B. Effects on WBAN Performance
Now, we are in the position to evaluate the effects of WiCop
on WBAN performance.
We reuse the experiment layout of Fig. 3. All wireless links
are Non-Line-Of-Sight (NLOS).
(a)
(b)
Fig. 13. (a) WiFi interference traffic when there is no policing (b) WiFi interference traffic when there is policing. The X axis is time (unit: second); the Y
axis is the the number of packets received in each 1ms time slot. In case of (b), WiCop sends a Fake-PHY-Header policing packet every 10ms to claim 5ms
of WBAN active interval.
Fig. 15. WiFi throughput degradation under WiCop policing. X axis is the
claimed length of WBAN active interval; Y axis is the throughput of WiFi
interference traffic. WBAN polling period is 25ms.
The WBAN is a centralized ZigBee WBAN, which runs a
WBAN polling period of 100ms, and a WBAN active interval
of 5ms. Both the WBAN base station and WBAN client (Mote-
C) transmits at 0dBm over a mutual distance of d2 = 4 feet.
The WiFi interferer (Host-I) runs IEEE 802.11g and trans-
mits at power level of 30dBm. Its distances to the WBAN
base station (Mote-B), WBAN client (Mote-C), and WiCop
policing node (Host-P) are all set to d1 = 6 feet. The
WiFi interference source end data rate is set to 15Mbps,
20Mbps, and 25Mbps respectively. For each WiFi interference
source end data rate, three experiment trials are carried out,
respectively corresponds to no policing, Fake-PHY-Header
policing, and DSSS-Nulling policing. Each trial lasts 300s.
The results are summarized by Fig. 16 and Fig. 17, which
plot the PRR and MTTF of the WBAN respectively.
A number of observations can be made. First, under heavy
WiFi interference (e.g., when WiFi interference source end
data rate is 25Mbps), the WBAN PRR degrades significantly
if there is no policing. Second, DSSS-Nulling policing per-
forms better than Fake-PHY-Header policing in maintaining
WBAN PRR under heavy WiFi interference. This is because
DSSS-Nulling policing signal continuously repeats throughout
the WBAN active interval; while Fake-PHY-Header policing
signal is just broadcasted once, right before each WBAN active
interval. Third, WiCop can significantly improve WBAN per-
formance under WiFi interference. For example, under heavy
WiFi interference (25Mbps trials), DSSS-Nulling policing can
improve PRR by 43.8% (from 0.683 to 0.982), and improve
MTTF from 3.1 seconds to 4.8 hours.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief overview of related work
pertaining to WiCop in the area of 1) WBAN and WiFi co-
existence, 2) Denial of Service attack (DoS) to WLANs, and
3) experimental evaluation in real medical settings.
A. Coexistence
It is widely accepted that WiFi can severely interfere ZigBee
communication [11][3][2]. Huang et. al.[11] argued that the
performance degradation of ZigBee in the presence of WiFi
interference is caused by two main reasons, namely power
asymmetry and carrier sense based CCA. Accordingly, Huang
Fig. 16. WBAN PRR under different WiFi interference source end data rates
Fig. 17. WBAN MTTF under different WiFi interference source end data
rates
designed a MAC protocol to detect and use the idle time
slice (white-spaces) in WiFi sessions. Shin et. al.[3] conducted
numerical analysis and simulations to evaluate the PER of
ZigBee communication under the interference of WiFi. It is
argued that WiFi would not impact ZigBee communication if
the separation of their center frequency is bigger than 7MHz.
The experiments in [2] showed that WiFi might interfere
ZigBee transmission significantly under certain conditions
even with a center frequency offset of 18MHz. Recently, many
researchers found that ZigBee transmitters might impact WiFi
performance under certain conditions [22][10][23]. Most of
these works use packet loss rates to measure the performance
of WBAN. However, in our work, applying ZigBee to latency
sensitive application, we use both MTTF and PRR as perfor-
mance metrics.
Hou[4] uses the duration field of the RTS MAC header to
reserve time. In the design, before broadcasting a beacon, a
ZigBee base station first send an RTS packet to reserve a
channel. This design bears similarity with the proposed Fake-
PHY-Header policing strategy, but Fake-PHY-Header has one
advantage over it: Fake-PHY-Header introduces less control
overhead. The reason is that Hou’s approach requires sending
a whole packet to reserve the channel, while our approach only
sends out a packet header, which takes less air time. Hou’s
design is more suitable to reserve a long duration. However,
WBANs typically support low duty cycle applications, and
thus continuous long duration is not needed.
Liang[10] proposes a mechanism to detect and estimate the
white-spaces in WiFi transmission and designs an MAC pro-
tocol to utilize white-spaces of different lengths. Arkoulis[24]
proposes a simple and efficient method to detect a single op-
erational frequency channel that guarantees satisfactory com-
munication. However, in some cases, whites-paces in time and
frequency domain may not exist or are insufficient. WiCop, in
contrast, enforces whites-paces on demand to support WBAN
traffic.
B. DoS
A few work has investigated mechanisms for jamming WiFi
transmissions from a security point of view. Karhima [25]
evaluated WiFi’s tolerance to wide-band and narrow-band jam-
ming. Park [26] and Mishra [27] studied partial-band jamming
to WiFi. The defect of current IEEE 802.11 standard has also
been exploited to attack WiFi. Gummadi et.al. [14] found
that some WiFi cards were sensitive to beacon losses. Thus,
jamming periodic beacon is an effective means to attack WiFi.
Our work aims to provide co-existence between WLANs and
WBANs. Thus, malicious attacking methods, such as jamming
beacon, fake death packet, are not considered. Wullems [20]
used the DSSSTESTMODE of a WiFi device to jam WLANs.
In this optional working mode, a WiFi device will transmit
continuous DSSS preambles, so that the other WiFi devices
in range will sense the channel as busy. Bellard [28] used
commercial hardware to carry out de-authentication and virtual
carrier-sense attack. They found that the later was not as
effective as the former. Thuente [29] studied several intelligent
jamming methods with the requirement of low power and low
detection probability, including DIFS waiting jamming, ACK
corruption jamming, fake RTS jamming, etc..
C. Experimental Evaluation in Medical Environments
Paksuniemi et. al. [30] reveals problem areas in patient mon-
itoring when applying Bluetooth, ZigBee and UWB to vital
sign monitoring in ICU and operating rooms. Chipara et. al.
[7] designed and deployed ZigBee based patient monitoring in
a general hospital unit. Ko et. al. [31] conducted experiments
on the patient monitoring in emergency rooms. However, few
of these works considers the interference from other wireless
technologies.
Garudadri [32] applied Compressed Sensing to ECG. This
approach uses the redundancy in periodic ECG trace, to
mitigate distortion under high packet losses. This approach
is orthogonal to WiCop and can be used in conjunction with
WiCop to further improve the robustness of ECG monitoring.
Finally, it should be noted that WiCop is a general mecha-
nism to regulate white-spaces in WiFi transmissions. Though
we have demonstrated its effectiveness with ZigBee-based
WBANs, it can be utilized to protect WBANs based on other
wireless technologies operating in the ISM bands.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our empirical study confirms that for safety-critical WBAN
medical applications (such as ECG) with stringent temporal
requirements, co-channel WiFi interference is an eminent
threat. To address this WBAN-WiFi coexistence challenge,
we can exploit WiFi’s CCA mechanisms to propose the
WiCop policing framework. By deploying Fake-PHY-Header
and DSSS-Nulling policing strategies, the WiCop policing
framework can effectively engineer the temporal white-spaces
of WiFi transmissions, reserving enough resource for WBAN
communications without significantly affecting WiFi perfor-
mance. We implemented and validated WiCop on SORA, a
software defined radio platform. Experiments show that with
the assistance of the proposed WiCop policing strategies, even
under heavy WiFi interference, the packet reception rate of a
ZigBee-based WBAN can increase by up to 43.8%.
As future work, we will extend WiCop in a number of
directions. First, we are interested in determining the optimal
bandwidth for the DSSS-Nulling. Second, we will experiment
with more WiFi devices and profile their compatibility. Third,
we will study the effect of WiCop on TCP over WiFi and
reduce the degradation to the later.
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